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ABSTRACT: Quantum Key Distribution (QKD) is an emerging cybersecurity 
technology which exploits the laws of quantum mechanics to generate shared 
secret keying material between two geographically separated parties. The 
unique nature of QKD shows promise for high-security applications such as 
those found in banking, government, and military environments. However, 
real-world QKD systems contain a variety of implementation non-idealities 
which can negatively impact system security and performance. This article 
provides an introduction to QKD for security professionals and describes 
recent developments in the field. Additionally, comments are offered on QKD’s 
advantages (i.e., the boon), its drawbacks (i.e., the bust), and its foreseeable 
viability as a cybersecurity technology.
uantum Key Distribution (QKD) is an emerging cybersecurity technology which 
provides the means for two geographically separated parties to grow “unconditionally 
secure” symmetric cryptographic keying material. Unlike traditional key distribution 
techniques, the security of QKD rests on the laws of quantum mechanics and not 
computational complexity. This unique aspect of QKD is due to the fact that any 
unauthorized eavesdropping on the key distribution channel necessarily introduces detectable 
errors (Gisin, Ribordy, Tittel, & Zbinden, 2002). This attribute makes QKD desirable for high-
security environments such as banking, government, and military applications. However, QKD 
is a nascent technology where implementation non-idealities can negatively impact system 
performance and security (Mailloux, Grimaila, Hodson, Baumgartner, & McLaughlin, 2015). 
While the QKD community is making progress towards the viability of QKD solutions, it is 
clear that more work is required to quantify the impact of such non-idealities in real-world QKD 
systems (Scarani & Kurtsiefer, 2009).
Written for security practitioners, managers, and decision makers, this article provides an 
accessible introduction to QKD and describes this seemingly strange quantum communications 
protocol in readily understandable terms. Additionally, this article highlights recent developments 
in the field from the 5th international Quantum Cryptography conference (QCrypt) hosted in fall 
of 2015 with an eye towards the US hosted conference in 2016. Lastly, we comment on several of 
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QKD’s advantages (i.e., the boon) and its drawbacks (i.e., the bust) 
while also considering QKD’s viability as a cybersecurity technology.
What is QKD?
The genesis of QKD traces back to the late 1960s, when Stephen 
Wiesner first proposed the idea of encoding information on 
photons to securely transfer messages (Wiesner, 1983). In 1984, 
the physicist Charles Bennett and cryptographer Gilles Brassard 
worked together to mature this idea by introducing the first QKD 
protocol, known as “BB84” (Bennett & Brassard, 1984). Five years 
later, they built the first QKD prototype system which was said to 
be “secure against any eavesdropper who happened to be deaf ” as it 
made audible noises while encoding crypto key onto single photons 
(Brassard, 2006). From its relatively humble beginnings, QKD has 
gained global interest as a unique cybersecurity solution with active 
research groups across North America, Europe, Australia, and Asia. 
Moreover, commercial offerings are now available from several 
vendors around the world: ID Quantique, SeQureNet, Quintessence 
Labs, MagiQ Technologies, Qasky Quantum Science Technology, 
and QuantumCTek (Oesterling, Hayford, & Friend, 2012).
Figure 1 illustrates a notional QKD system architecture consisting 
of a sender “Alice,” a receiver “Bob,” a quantum channel (an optical 
fiber or line-of-sight free space path), and a classical channel (a 
conventional network connection). Alice is shown with a laser 
source configured to generate single photons, while Bob measures 
them using specialized Single Photon Detectors (SPDs). The QKD 
system provides a point-to-point solution for generating shared 
secret key, , which can be used to encrypt sensitive data, voice, or 
video communications as desired by the user.
Commercial QKD systems often use the secret key  to increase 
the security posture of traditional symmetric encryption algorithms 
through frequent re-keying. For example, a QKD system can be 
used to update a 256-bit AES key once a second. This increases the 
cryptosystem’s security posture by significantly reducing the time and 
information available to an adversary for performing cryptanalysis.
Alternatively, QKD systems can be used to provide an unlimited 
supply of secret keying material for use in the one-time pad 
encryption algorithm – the only known cryptosystem to achieve 
perfect secrecy (Vernam, 1926), (Shannon, 1949). However, the 
one-time pad has strict keying requirements, which are not easy to 
meet with conventional technologies. More specifically, the keying 
material must be: 1. truly random, 2. never reused, and 3. as long as 
the message to be encrypted. Thus, the appeal of QKD is found in 
its ability to generate (or grow) shared cryptographic key, making 
unbreakable one-time pad encryption configurations possible.
How Does QKD Work?
To understand how QKD works, we describe the original BB84 
prepare-and-measure, polarization-based protocol as it remains a 
popular implementation choice and is relatively easy to understand 
compared to other QKD protocols (Gisin, Ribordy, Tittel, & 
Zbinden, 2002).
Figure 2 illustrates the QKD protocol as a series of eight steps. 
While these steps (or processes) can be depicted in a number of ways, 
we have chosen this flow to clearly illustrate how the QKD protocol 
behaves. In an actual system, these steps would most likely overlap 
and/or execute in parallel. Note that Quantum Exchange is the only 
step where the laws of quantum mechanics are directly applicable. 
Figure. 1. Quantum Key Distribution (QKD) system context diagram. The sender “Alice” and receiver “Bob” are configured to generate 
shared secret key for use in bulk encryptors, where the quantum channel (i.e., a free space or optical fiber link) is used to securely 
transmit single photons and the classical channel is used to control specific QKD processes and protocols.
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Somewhat of a misnomer, most of the QKD protocol is achieved 
through classical information theory “post-processing” steps.
In step 1, Alice and Bob authenticate with each other to ensure 
they are communicating with the expected party. Typically, this 
authentication is accomplished with the lesser known Wegman-
Carter authentication technique to meet QKD’s unconditional 
security claim (Scarani, et al., 2009). Moreover, unlike most cyber 
systems which authenticate only when initiating communications, 
QKD systems often utilize a transactional authentication scheme 
where authentication occurs after each step (or a sequence of steps) 
according to the specific system implementation.
Table 1. The prepare and measure, polarization-based BB84 QKD protocol.














⊕ 0 |↔⟩ ⊕ 0 or 1
⊕ 1 |↕⟩ ⊗ Random
⊗ 0 |⤢⟩ ⊕ Random
⊗ 1 |⤡⟩ ⊗ 0 or 1
During quantum exchange (step 2), Alice prepares single 
photons, known as quantum bits or “qubits,” in one of four 
polarization states |↔⟩, |↕⟩, |⤢⟩, or |⤡⟩. The photon’s polarization 
state is prepared according to a randomly selected basis and bit 
value as shown in Table 1. Each photon is then transmitted to 
Bob through the quantum channel, where it can  be subject to 
significant loss (e.g., >90% loss is common). This is due to the 
loss that is experienced by single photons when they propagate 
over long distances through optical fiber or line-of-sight free 
space links. Due to the inherent challenges of single photon 
propagation, a majority of Alice’s photons are lost during 
transmission, thereby limiting the system’s effective operational 
distance to <100 km (Scarani, et al., 2009).
Assuming Alice’s encoded photon arrives at Bob, he must 
randomly select a measurement basis for each detected photon. 
If Bob measures the photon with the correctly matching basis, 
the encoded bit value (0 or 1) is obtained with a high degree 
of confidence. Conversely, if Bob measures the photon with the 
incorrect basis, a random result occurs and the originally prepared 
bit value is destroyed. This quantum mechanical phenomenon 
underpins QKD’s secure key generation where measuring a 
photon in flight forces its encoded state to collapse and prevents 
accurate copies from being made (i.e., the No Cloning Theorem) 












● Authenticate all messages
3. Sift non-matching detections
● Exchange basis information
● Confirm basis selection
● Calculate other parameters




4. Estimate quantum error rate
● Select detections to compare
● Calculate preliminary error rate
● Check error rate threshold
6. Estimate information loss
● Account for loss sources
● Calculate loss estimate
8. Deliver final key
● Compute/Compare hashes
● Deliver keys to encryptors
5. Error reconcilation
● Identify/Correct errors
● Calculate actual qubit
error rate (QBER)
● Check QBER threshold
7. Amplift security of key
● Manipulate key bits




Figure. 2. Eight steps of the Quantum Key Distribution (QKD) process.
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of detections at Bob, which need to be correlated with Alice’s 
sent photons through a sifting process.
In step 3, Bob’s detections are sifted to eliminate incorrect (non-
matching) basis measurements. In general, 50% of Bob’s detections 
will be in the wrong basis and sifted out because of his random basis 
selection. This results in a shared sifted key, known as the “raw key,” 
in both Alice and Bob approximately half the size of Bob’s initial 
set of detections. 
Next, an estimate of the quantum exchange error rate is 
calculated in step 4. Typically, a random percentage of bits are 
selected and compared over the classical channel. The estimated 
error rate is used to inform the error reconciliation technique 
(step 5), and can also be used to conduct an initial security check. 
This step is particularly important for QKD’s theoretical security 
posture as all errors during quantum exchange are attributed 
to eavesdroppers since the QKD protocol cannot discriminate 
between noise and malicious interference. Thus, if the estimated 
error rate exceeds the predetermined QKD error threshold (e.g., 
11%), the raw key must be discarded as an adversary is assumed 
to be listening (Scarani, et al., 2009). Typically, the key generation 
is then restarted.
In step 5, error reconciliation is performed to correct any errors 
in Alice and Bob’s raw keys. Due to device non-idealities and 
physical disturbances during quantum exchange, expected error 
rates are typically 3-5% (Gisin, Ribordy, Tittel, & Zbinden, 2002). 
Error reconciliation techniques employ specialize bi-directional 
correction algorithms (e.g., Winnow, Cascade, or Low-Density 
Parity-Check) to minimize the amount of information “leaked” 
over the classical channel to eavesdroppers (Scarani, et al., 2009). 
With a high probability, this step results in a perfectly matched, 
error free shared secret key between Alice and Bob. The error 
reconciliation step results in a formalized Quantum Bit Error Rate 
(QBER), which is again checked against the QKD security proof 
threshold (e.g., 11%) to determine if an eavesdropper is listening 
on the quantum key distribution channel (Scarani, et al., 2009). 
If the security threshold is exceeded, the key must be discarded 
and the process is restarted.
Next, entropy estimation (step 6) accounts for the amount of 
secret key information leaked while executing the QKD protocol 
steps. For example, during quantum exchange, information leakage 
occurs from non-ideal laser sources which produce insecure 
multi-photon pulses. In another example, error reconciliation 
communications over the classical channel leaks information about 
the secret key. In general, conservative loss estimates are made; 
however, implementations may differ considerably (Slutsky, Rao, 
Sun, Tancevski, & Fainman, 1998). The entropy estimate is then 
passed to the privacy amplification step, which corrects for the 
information leakage and ensures the eavesdropper has negligible 
information regarding the QKD-generated shared secret key. 
More specifically, step 7 employs advanced information theory 
techniques such as a universal hash function to produce a more 
secure final shared secret key (Scarani, et al., 2009).
Lastly, in order to ensure the final symmetric crypto keys are the 
same, a hash of Alice and Bob’s keys are compared. If they match, 
the keys are delivered to the system owner. These unconditionally 
secure shared symmetric keys can then be used as desired by 
the user to protect sensitive information with the unbreakable 
one-time pad encryption scheme or supplement more practical 
encryption schemes such as AES. For readers interested in more 
details, a security-oriented description of QKD is available in 
(Mailloux, Grimaila, Hodson, Baumgartner, & McLaughlin, 2015) 
with comprehensive physics based discussions in (Scarani, et al., 
2009) and (Gisin, Ribordy, Tittel, & Zbinden, 2002).
Figure 3. The ID Quantique (IDQ) rack mountable QKD system is shown on 
the top (ID Quantique, 2016) and the Toshiba record holding hybrid QKD 
system is shown on the bottom (Dixon, et al., 2015). 
Observations from Quantum Cryptography 
Conference (QCrypt) 2015
Over the past several years, the annual QCrypt conference has 
served as the world’s premier forum for students and researchers 
to present and collaborate on all aspects of quantum cryptography. 
QCrypt is also the primary forum for announcing the year’s best 
QKD results. In late 2015, the fifth QCrypt conference was hosted 
in Tokyo, Japan and attended by more than 275 participants with a 
largely international audience of physicists, information theorists, 
and cryptographers (Quantum Cryptography Conference, 2016). 
From this conference, key observations are offered for the reader 
to gain perspective on recent developments in the quantum 
cryptography field.
 i Striving for Commercial Viability – QCrypt 2105 
began with several demonstrations and talks focused on 
practically-oriented QKD systems which balance cost, 
performance, and security trades towards affordability. 
In particular, the QKD industry leader, ID Quantique, 
unveiled a completely redesigned QKD blade system which 
employs a new quantum exchange protocol, anti-tamper 
precautions, and additional security features to mitigate 
quantum attacks (ID Quantique, 2016). Likewise, Toshiba 
Research Laboratory Europe, supported by Japan’s National 
Institute of Information and Communications Technology, 
prominently displayed their record breaking QKD system. 
The Toshiba system boasts the world’s highest key rates, 
improved user interface, and automated synchronization for 
increased usability over metropolitan distances (Dixon, et 
al., 2015). Unlike early experimental QKD configurations, 
these systems are designed to be rack mountable and more 
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easily integratable into existing communications structures. 
Figure 3 shows both the commercially viable ID Quantique 
and Toshiba QKD systems.
 i Fielding QKD Networks – For distributed networks and 
long distance operation, QKD requires the use of either 
quantum repeaters or satellite-based solutions. While fully 
functional quantum repeaters are years away from being 
realized, simpler stop-gap “trusted node” configurations have 
been successfully fielded (Scarani, et al., 2009). These QKD 
networks utilize a series of back-to-back QKD systems 
to cover larger metropolitan areas and support long-haul 
backbone distances. Using this method, China is building 
the world’s largest QKD network along its west coast 
employing 46 nodes to cover some 2,000 km (Wang, et al., 
2014). Similarly, one of the conference’s keynotes, the US 
research organization Battelle, described their development 
of trusted nodes with ID Quantique to support a 1,000 km 
planned run from Columbus, Ohio to Washington, D.C. 
(Quantum Cryptography Conference, 2016). With respect 
to satellite-to-ground QKD, research centers in America, 
Canada, Europe, Japan, and China are exploring the feasibility 
of and conducting experiments to prove the feasibility of 
transmitting single photons from a Low Earth Orbit (LEO) 
satellite through the Earth’s turbulent atmosphere. Most 
notably, China is actively pursuing their goal of launching a 
QKD satellite by 2016 (Bieve, 2016). Figure 4 depicts both 
China’s terrestrial QKD network and their planned space-
based QKD links.
 i Barriers to Acceptance – While a majority of the research-
focused conference is focused on improvements to QKD 
protocols, quantum hardware, and information theory 
advancements, arguably, the most important theme of the 
conference pertained to the acceptance of QKD (or lack 
thereof ) as a cybersecurity solution. As repeatedly recognized 
during QCrypt 2015, several significant barriers to QKD’s 
acceptance exist. This was perhaps best captured by the field’s 
most recognized researcher, Dr. Nicolas Gisin, who boldly 
stated “The quantum technology era has started… In 10 years 
either QKD will have found its markets or will be dead” (Gisin, 
2015). In a cybersecurity community that typically adopts 
new technological solutions rather quickly, quantum based 
security technologies are slow to be adopted. Perhaps, security 
professionals are uncomfortable with the topic of quantum 
mechanics? Or perhaps, QKD developers are just now starting 
to make progress on critical implementation security issues, 
interoperability standards, and formal certifications (ETSI, 
2015). 
From these overarching conference themes, we next elaborate 
on some of QKD’s advantages and disadvantages in order to help 
security professionals better understand the technology and its 
application. Thus, while a bit subjective in nature, and not without 
debate, we’ve chosen to describe three ways in which QKD is a boon 
to the cybersecurity community and three ways in which it is a bust.
The Boon
While there are several ways to describe the advantages of QKD, 
in this article the authors’ have chosen to approach this challenge 
from the user’s perspective. Meaning, we desire to provide a useful 
commentary which addresses the utility of QKD (and its related 
developments) for an end user and not merely elaborate on the 
merits of its research or what it could be.
1. Generates Unconditionally Secure Keying Material – 
Leveraging the laws of quantum mechanics, QKD is the 
only known means which can grow unlimited amounts of 
symmetric keying material to effectively employ the one-time 
pad cryptosystem (the only unbreakable encryption scheme 
known). This formalized information-theoretic security 
foundation is much stronger than conventional encryption 
techniques which depend on demonstrated computational 
complexity. This is precisely why QKD has gained global 
recognition as an emerging cybersecurity technology in the 
face of quantum computing advances which threaten other 
conventional cryptosystems such as RSA.
2. Quantum Random Number Generators  –  In order to maintain 
their information-theoretic security posture, QKD systems 
require true sources of randomness. Thus, the advancement of 
QKD has successfully facilitated the development of quantum 
random number generators. These devices provide a physical 
source of randomness based on quantum phenomenon which 
is desirable for cryptographic devices, software applications, and 
other industries. Of note, the gaming/gambling industry is said 
to be the world’s largest consumer of random number generators 
and a fiscally rewarding enterprise. While QKD upstarts seem 
to come and go, there is a definite need for cheap and reliable 
sources of entropy in the commercial market.
3. Strengthens the Cybersecurity Field – QKD encourages 
multidisciplinary collaboration amongst information theorists, 
engineers, cryptography experts, security professionals, and 
physicists that may not occur otherwise. Establishing these 
types of interactions is critical for advancements in several 
cyber related fields such as quantum communication, quantum 
sensing, and quantum computing. For example, the integration 
of computer scientists and quantum physicists is necessary 
for the development and utilization of quantum computing 
algorithms. On a related note, QKD has also brought 
about the occurrence of “Quantum Hacking” (Institute of 
Quantum Computing, University of Waterloo, 2014). This 
growing specialty area is testing the security of new quantum 
technologies and protocols, and perhaps someday, we’ll even 
have security assessments which include quantum red teams.
The Bust
QKD systems have performance limitations, device non-idealities, 
and system vulnerabilities which are not well understood (Scarani 
& Kurtsiefer, 2009). Thus, potential users often question both the 
effectiveness of the technology and its system security posture. For 
QKD to be accepted as a cybersecurity technology the following 
critical issues (at a minimum) should be addressed.
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Figure 4. China’s 46 node terrestrial QKD network is shown on the left and the planned space-based QKD 
network is shown on the right (Quantum Cryptography Conference, 2016).
1. QKD is Point-to-Point Technology – Because QKD is a 
point-to-point solution, it does not scale well for modern 
communications infrastructures. While gains are being made 
towards networked key management solutions, they are 
fundamentally limited by QKD’s quantum underpinnings, 
which prevent the amplification of single photons (Wootters 
& Zurek, 1982). Given this critical limitation, QKD does not 
appear to be a good fit for wide scale implementation and 
may only be viable for specialized two site applications such 
as encrypted voice communications in a metropolitan area.
2. Implementation Security Vulnerabilities –  QKD systems 
have implementation non-idealities which introduce 
vulnerabilities and negatively impact both performance and 
security. For example, these “unconditionally secure” QKD 
systems protocols are vulnerable to attacks over the quantum 
channel, including man-in-the-middle (authentication 
failures), intercept/resend (measuring and replacing photons), 
photon number splitting (stealing photons), and blinding 
optical receivers (unauthorized laser sources). Additionally, 
QKD systems are also vulnerable to common cybersecurity 
attacks against computers, applications, and protocols. 
These implementation security issues and their resulting 
vulnerabilities must be well-studied and addressed through 
established architectural design principles, verifiable designs, 
and assured operational configurations to provide trustworthy 
systems to end users.
3. No Formal Certification Method – As high-security crypto 
devices, QKD systems should undergo formal security 
assessments and certification processes to address (at a 
minimum) physical attacks, side channel analysis, and data 
manipulation. However, within the QKD community there 
is little discussion thereof, and arguably sluggish progress 
towards an independent certification process (ETSI, 2015). 
Furthermore, QKD developers must adopt a more holistic 
view of security including proactive techniques such as 
assuring secure operational baselines and continuous 
monitoring of the system’s communication links.
Despite QKD's drawbacks, the technology does show promise 
as an enabler to unbreakable encryption (i.e., generating unlimited 
amounts of random key for use in On-Time Pad encryption) for 
niche applications such as point-to-point communications and 
data transfer.
Conclusion
Security professionals recognize that ongoing advancements 
in quantum computing (along with Shor’s algorithm for quickly 
factoring large prime numbers) threaten the security of modern 
public key cryptography techniques such as RSA (Monz, et al., 
2015). Thus, new post-quantum security solutions need to be given 
serious consideration as indicated by the National Security Agency’s 
recent announcement specifying “a transition to quantum resistant 
algorithms” for their cryptographic Suite B algorithms (NSA, 2015). 
While this transition will occur slowly over time, organizations with 
significant data protection requirements such as the US Government 
(i.e., 25 years of data protection) must start thinking about post-
quantum crypto solutions now.
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While unbreakable one-time pad encryption solutions enabled by 
QKD provide the ultimate protection available (they are proven secure 
against advances in quantum computing), they do not fit well into 
the established communications infrastructure. Conversely, quantum 
resistant algorithms (encryption techniques which are shown to not 
be easily broken by quantum computers) have the benefit of fitting 
nicely into the existing infrastructure (Bernstein, 2009).
With an eye towards QCrypt 2016, hosted by the US based Joint 
Center for Quantum Information and Computer Science, perhaps 
the QKD community will begin to adopt a wider perspective on 
the field of quantum cryptography. For example, the US’s premier 
quantum center seeks to more broadly advance the state of the art 
in quantum algorithms, quantum communication, and quantum 
computing instead of merely focusing on QKD (University 
of Maryland, 2016). Moreover, the US National Institute of 
Standards and Technology (NIST) recently stood up a multi-year 
project to explore quantum resistant algorithms (2016) and a new 
international conference series on post-quantum cryptography 
is quickly gaining attention (2016). Perhaps, these events are 
evidences that a change is occurring in the QKD community, an 
evolution towards more viable cryptographic solutions. 
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